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 1 
Introduction 
Information technology-enabled games are being seen as management tools to assist problem-
solving in a broad range of areas including marketing, education, and healthcare (Harman et al. 
2014). Online innovation contests are a form of gamification of the new product development 
(NPD) process and are increasingly being recognized as enablers of open innovation strategies 
(Bayus 2013), and as integration tools in large and geographically dispersed research and 
development (R&D) teams (van Dijk & van den Ende 2002; Simula & Ahola 2014). An important 
advantage of innovation contests is that they allow companies to manage the critical tension in NPD 
between the breadth of idea generation and the quality of screening and selection. 
Despite their increasing adoption, there is little systematic evidence on internal innovation contests. 
Some notable exceptions are the studies by Spears et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2009), LaComb et al. 
(2007), Santos and Spann (2011) and Soukhoroukova et al. (2012) which emphasize their 
effectiveness for eliciting creativity, mobilizing existing knowledge, and enhancing communication. 
They are known also to improve the screening and selection of large pools of new product ideas, a 
task traditionally carried out by small committees of R&D managers. An expert crowd can 
economize on managers' valuable time and attention by highlighting the most promising ideas. 
Understanding the critical task of idea evaluation is an open research problem in the field of 
innovation contests (Adamczyk et al. 2012). A crucial issue, so far neglected in the literature, 
concerns the extent to which a crowd uses different criteria to evaluate a new product idea, and 
relies on different types of information compared to a management committee. This is a particularly 
relevant issue and invites a better understanding of the information-seeking and decision-making 
processes of groups engaged in complex evaluation tasks, and a better appreciation of the effect of 
structural features such as composition and background (i.e. a small committee with managerial 
experience vs. a large crowd of researchers and technical experts). This can have direct implications 
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for the design and planning of innovation contests: understanding whether committees and crowds 
rely on diverging or overlapping information in their evaluations, justifies use of crowds for idea 
screening to contribute new insights to those offered by committees. 
The questions that motivate our analysis are whether the features of ideas that crowds and 
committees associate with higher quality are similar or different, and what strategies crowds and 
committees adopt to evaluate new product ideas under conditions of bounded rationality.  
We address these questions by analyzing an innovation contest implemented by the Danish 
multinational company Novozymes. The company launched an internal idea generation project 
aimed at identifying an invention with high market potential in the field of industrial enzymes. The 
contest was open to a selected group of employees from the company’s eight research centers 
located in six countries, and involved a committee composed of managers from the R&D 
department involved in various stages of the NPD process. A virtual preference market was 
designed to accompany idea generation and selection.  
This empirical setting allows direct comparison of the preferences of a crowd of experts and a 
management committee. Since both groups rely on similar information about the projects and the 
inventors, we are able to assess what drives the divergences in their evaluations.  
This paper is one of the first empirical studies to compare a committee’s vis-à-vis crowd’s 
rationality in a complex problem solving setting such as idea generation – a phenomenon that has 
been theorized only recently (Afuah & Tucci 2012; Poetz & Schreier 2012). Specifically, we find 
that the crowd and the management committee associate different aspects of proposals to quality: 
the former tends to focus on the characteristics of the ideas, and the latter on the characteristics of 
the inventors. This result seems consistent with the notion that bounded rationality drives decision-
makers to rely on heuristics and knowledge that are closest to their expertise. Also, we find that 
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 3 
crowds, like other decision-makers, are subject to a threshold in their ability to process information. 
These findings suggest that companies should adopt preference market-based innovation contests to 
complement rather than to substitute for traditional managerial evaluation in the NPD process. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we develop the theoretical framework and 
hypotheses; section 3 presents the research setting and section 4 discusses the empirical results. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of the findings, and some managerial implications and 
perspectives for future research. 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Innovation contests as a mechanism for idea generation 
In line with Xu et al. (2014), we suggest that NPD in research-based industries builds essentially on 
knowledge management capabilities. Therefore, innovative companies should develop methods for 
the systematic acquisition, elaboration, recombination, application and retention of scientific, 
technological, and market knowledge. These systems should be designed with the purpose of 
disseminating and integrating this formal and informal knowledge among all the units involved in 
the NPD process, and their use should be endorsed by authoritative figures in the organization (Pitt 
& MacVaugh 2008). Empirical studies show that the implementation of knowledge management 
systems is associated with reduced time to market and enhanced new product performance (Vaccaro 
et al. 2010). 
A key issue in the design of knowledge management system is the awareness of users of the 
available information, and therefore, its exploitation (Khedhaouria & Jamal, 2015). NPD is exposed 
to the risk of redundancy and underutilization of available information due to the number of units 
involved and the amount of information required for successful completion of the process. Research 
in this area focuses on the development of systems that facilitate knowledge acquisition and sharing 
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in collaborative teams (e.g. Zhen et al. 2013) and assist groups in preference decisions such as 
evaluation, prioritization, and selection, in conditions of multiple and conflicting criteria (e.g. Chiu 
et al. 2006).  
Innovation contests have emerged as a tool that encompasses the activities of idea generation, 
knowledge sharing, and prioritization and selection. Examination and ranking of ideas is at the core 
of NPD models (Magnusson et al. 2014), and since it entails specific managerial challenges, marks 
the conclusion of the idea generation stage. In the early idea generation stage, R&D organizations 
seek to increase the volume and variety of knowledge sources (Yang & Rui 2009) in order to 
benefit from opportunities for recombination and integration (Fleming & Sorenson 2001), while 
selection of ideas calls for a concentration of the evaluator’s cognitive resources on the most 
promising proposals.  
However, the limited cognitive resources and attention of R&D management preclude thorough 
examination of large sets of ideas: managerial committees tend to be selective and to address 
proposals that are closest to their experience (Piezunka & Dahlander 2014; Haas et al. 2015). In 
addition, small group dynamics might bias the quality of the evaluation. Gamification of the NPD 
process, e.g. via innovation contests, allows an increased number of potential proposals while 
protecting key decision-makers from information overload (Soukhoroukova et al. 2012), and the 
firm from missing potential technological opportunities. Figure 1 summarizes the contributions of 
innovation contests to NPD. 
Figure 1. Major advantages of innovation contests in the NPD process. 
===PLEASE, INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE=== 
Innovation contests are designed to allow participants to propose solutions to challenges defined by 
the organizing firms, in exchange for a reward for the best ideas/solutions. A committee of internal 
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 5 
experts, sometimes assisted by participants, filters the proposals to identify those that could be 
valuable to the company. The selected ideas then undergo a maturation process to improve their 
technical or commercial feasibility (Piller & Walcher 2006).  
Research has identified the conditions where involvement of a broad community is the preferred 
means to address an innovation objective, especially if the firm is exploring solutions outside its 
technological competences. The firm should be able effectively to convey the problem, to involve a 
heterogeneous pool of participants, to evaluate large numbers of ideas, and to manage the 
information technology infrastructure necessary to support the contest (Afuah and Tucci, 2012). In 
the screening and evaluation of ideas, an organizer evaluates the solutions proposed by participants, 
from multiple perspectives including feasibility, ﬁt with the firm's competencies, and expected 
return on investment. This task is demanding of managerial attention because innovation contests 
provoke numerous ideas, very few of which are valuable from a business perspective (Mortara et al. 
2013). This implies that companies should consider the potential trade-offs between variety of 
ideas, the quality of ideas, and managerial attention. 
Improving the efficiency of idea screening with preference markets 
The task of idea evaluation typically is carried out by company experts assisted by specific decision 
support systems (Chan & Ip 2010); however, it may be devolved to a crowd and managed as a 
game, e.g. by means of a preference market, a tool that permits the integration of idea generation 
and idea evaluation (Slamka et al. 2012). 
Participants in a preference market submit their own ideas to a virtual platform, and assess their 
peers’ ideas using a trading mechanism. Each idea is represented by a security, and participants 
trade securities using play money. Assuming that trading decisions reflect participants’ evaluations 
of the quality of the ideas, it is possible to rank them using information generated in the market – 
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e.g. volume-weighted average trading price, or the last ﬁxed price. Organizers motivate traders to 
reveal their preferences by offering a reward based on the value of their share portfolio and play 
money. The functioning of preference markets rests on the notion of “crowdsourcing” where the 
aggregation of a large number of individual opinions, although biased, is more effective than the 
judgments of a small group of experts (Surowiecki 2004). Thus, aggregation of information 
provided by a pool of independent participants is expected to reveal the quality of the ideas. 
However, it is not possible to compare the outcomes of a preference market with the “real” value of 
the ideas: only a few ideas are subsequently developed and become products; and also, the revenues 
generated by those products are revealed only years after the their launch. For these reasons, panels 
of experts determine the final ranking of ideas presented in a preference market (Slamka et al. 
2012). 
Hypotheses about the decision-making of committees and crowds 
From a behavioral perspective, the decisions made by individuals and teams in the NPD screening 
and selection stages, are subject to bounded rationality due to the limited available information, and 
constraints related to the agents’ cognitive resources, time, and attention (Cyert & March 1963; 
March & Simon 1958). The impossibility of a complete understanding of the environmental 
dynamics, drives the actors to conduct their screening and selection based on specialisms in specific 
domains (Krishnan & Ulrich 2001), problems that are proximate to their existing scientific and 
technological expertise (Tripsas & Gavetti 2000), and heuristics enabling prioritization among 
projects (Ocasio 1997; Bentzen et al. 2011).  
In the case of NPD, managers tend to focus on different attributes depending on their seniority 
(senior vs. middle management), and the type of experience accumulated in their position through 
learning by doing (Behrens et al. 2014). This theoretical approach throws light on how crowds and 
committees differ in their evaluation of novel product concepts and technologies. 
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Scientists are influenced by the nature of their jobs which require rational decision-making and 
critical thinking, and they tend to rely more on logic and objective data in their work decisions, 
compared to other professions (Lounsbury et al. 2012). In an innovation contest, the judgment of an 
expert crowd is based mostly on information about the idea disclosed by the inventor at submission, 
and on information generated during the competition, e.g. by trading dynamics in the preference 
market. We would expect crowds to focus on proposals accompanied by rich and complete 
information since this allows thorough examination of their technological and competitive strengths 
and weaknesses. Committees also value information on the ideas but are able to supplement it with 
additional information on the inventors. 
We argue that the attitudes to decision making of a committee and of a crowd of R&D professionals 
differ, because R&D managers ground their NPD decisions on both rational/analytic reasoning and 
on intuition (Eling et al. 2014) and interpretation of signals (Bentzen et al. 2011). Reputation is a 
mechanism that reduces complexity in decision making (Ferris et al. 2014; Ching et al. 1992), so 
evaluators will direct their limited attention and cognitive resources to ideas submitted by 
employees who signal better innovation capabilities. Specifically, inventors’ experience in 
patenting, scientific publishing, and idea generation is an objective indicator of innovation 
capabilities (Subramanian et al. 2013). Tenure in the organization can play a similar role since it is 
associated with deeper knowledge of the priorities and routines of the R&D department; this 
knowledge combined with creativity, greatly enhances an employee’s ability to generate 
discontinuous inventions. These criteria are more relevant to a committee in particular because they 
indicate an inventor's ability to generate proposals that will provide competitive advantage, a new 
product idea attribute that is valued highly especially by middle R&D management (Behrens et al. 
2014). We hypothesize that: 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 C
O
PE
N
H
A
G
EN
 B
U
SI
N
ES
S 
SC
H
O
O
L 
A
t 0
6:
25
 0
7 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
6 
(P
T)
 8 
Hypothesis-1: A crowd and a committee assess new product proposals with reference to different 
attributes; specifically, crowds privilege idea-related features while management committees 
prioritize inventor-related features. 
We have suggested that the process of idea screening and selection is subject to bounded rationality, 
cognitive specialization, and limited attention of decision-makers. Therefore, we expect that 
proposals containing very detailed idea descriptions quickly saturate evaluators’ attention; they may 
include unnecessary issues,  and may be more difficult to interpret. Information overload occurs 
when inventors convey information through multiple channels which increases redundancies (Liu 
1998; Citroen 2011; Soukhoroukova et al. 2012). This is a relevant problem in our case if inventors 
supplement textual descriptions with links and attachments. Given the bounded rationality of 
evaluators, these ideas will attract a lower ranking. We expect this constraint to affect crowds more 
than management committees, because crowds make their decisions based mostly on information 
about the idea. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis-2: In crowd’s evaluation, the quality of new product ideas is associated with the 
availability of a moderate amount of information. 
Figure 2 summarizes the key relationships examined in our study. 
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the conceptual model. 
===PLEASE, INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE=== 
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Empirical setting 
Grow Bets 2011 
The empirical setting of our study is the innovation contest “Grow Bets 2011” launched by the 
Danish biotech company Novozymes with the purpose of identifying inventions with the potential 
to outperform existing technologies and open up valuable market opportunities. Novozymes is a 
world leader in the production of industrial enzymes and microorganisms, and sells over 700 
products in 130 different countries and 40 different industries. When the campaign was launched in 
October 2011, the company had 5,400 employees, 1,024 of whom worked in its R&D organization. 
Its laboratories are located in Denmark, the USA (3 sites), Brazil, China, India and Japan. 
Novozymes’ Innovation Office, the unit of the R&D department that facilitates NPD initiatives, 
designed an internal innovation contest with the objective of boosting idea generation while 
decreasing the complexity of evaluation.  
Structure of the contest 
The contest was structured in three stages:  
• Idea generation and evaluation by means of a virtual platform including a preference market, 
open to a crowd selected from the R&D department. The ten ideas with the highest value at 
the close of the preference market were presented to the senior R&D management for a 
further screening; 
• Selection of 15 valuable ideas among those ranked below 10
th
 position in the preference 
market. This task was assigned to the “Screen Team”, a committee composed of seven R&D 
managers tasked with re-considering ideas that the crowd might have overlooked; 
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• Maturation of 5 ideas selected by senior R&D management from among the 25 identified by 
the crowd and the Screen Team. Top management had the final decision on which ideas 
should progress to the later stages of the NPD process. 
The design of the contest offers the methodological opportunity to compare the attributes of the 
proposals that the participants in the market and the members of the Screen Team associated with 
idea value. Our units of analysis are the ideas ranked lower than 10
th
 position in the market because 
these were the ideas evaluated by both the crowd and the committee.  
The preference market 
The participants in the contest were selected by a group of senior members of the R&D and 
business development departments from among employees with high innovation potential. 
Participation was restricted to an “elite” group in order to increase ideation efficiency; however, this 
choice potentially reduces knowledge base heterogeneity. To avoid this limitation, variety in 
discipline, rank, and geography was assured. 
The virtual platform for idea generation and trading was open for 12 working days. Participants 
could submit as many ideas as they wished. Only six inventors made use of the option to submit 
ideas anonymously. Inventors were mandated to provide a textual description of the idea, and had 
the option to attach an unlimited number of documents and to include links to Internet websites. 
Participants could search the ideas which were categorized into three broad areas referring to the 
application of the invention.  
Each idea represented a share in the market. When the market opened, participants were given an 
amount of virtual dollars which they could invest in the ideas considered to have the best potential 
as a new product; shares could also be sold, e.g. if newly submitted ideas were more attractive. 
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 11
Purchase of shares in one’s own ideas, and short-selling, were not allowed. Transactions were 
concluded not by matching buy and sell orders but by means of an automated market maker: all 
orders were executed instantly, and provoked variations in the price of shares based on the amount 
traded, according to an algorithm developed by Hanson (2007). Participants gathered information 
on ideas by looking at their prices, their descriptions, and the comments posed by participants to 
offer feedback to inventors and information to investors.  
Participants had easy access via the company’s internal directory, to information on the ranks and 
work positions of inventors, and could obtain information on prior patenting and publication from 
databases accessible to R&D staff. Therefore, both the Screen Team and the participants had access 
to the same pool of information although we do not know which data they utilized. Therefore, 
differences in the kind of information associated with quality should be attributed not to its 
availability but to its use. 
To incentivize participants to invest in the ideas which they believed had the highest potential, the 
Innovation Office rewarded the traders with the most valuable portfolios at the close of the market. 
Although the prizes were symbolic, they were awarded during a ceremony which gave considerable 
internal visibility to the winners.  
Participation in the innovation contest 
The Innovation Office invited 145 employees to participate and 109 took up the invitation: 74 
submitted ideas and 101 traded on the preference market. Table 1 summarizes the demographic 
profiles of participants. At the end of the campaign, 222 ideas had been submitted, half that number 
during the first 5 days of the contest. About 50% of the inventors presented one idea, and about 
10% presented more than seven ideas. The market value of the shares at the close of the market 
ranged between 0 and 30,391. Valuable ideas were scarce: 46 (20%) closed with a market value 
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equal to zero (and 14 ideas were never traded). The median market value (1,770) is notably lower 
than the mean (3,855) and the value of the 10
th
 idea (17,560). 
===PLEASE, INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE=== 
Analytical strategy 
Our analytical strategy is aimed at identifying the attributes of new product ideas that the 
participants in the preference market and the Screen Team associate to quality. 
We excluded from the analysis ideas that were submitted anonymously and ideas where complete 
details on inventors are not available; one Screen Team choice is excluded for these reasons. This 
procedure led us to consider 201 of the 212 ideas ranking below 10
th
 position in the preference 
market. Table 2 summarizes the variables used to characterize the ideas and their measures. 
===PLEASE, INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE=== 
After conducting a descriptive analysis, we ran regression analyses to estimate screen team choice 
(STC) using a probit model, and final market value (FMV) using a Tobit model. The FMV variable 
is constrained between 0 and 17,559, i.e. the FMV of the 10
th
 idea minus 1. All the models present 
the coefficients and the marginal effects at the medians. For the two FMV models which rely on 
interaction effects, we perform graphical analysis and disaggregation of the interaction effect 
recommended by Bowen (2012). We cluster robust standard errors based on inventor or inventing 
team, to account for possible correlation of observations. We can exclude significant bias in our 
results from multicollinearity since the maximum variable inflation factor in the interacted model is 
4.94, below the threshold of 10, even though the highest correlation coefficient among the 
independent variables is 0.61. The full correlation matrix is available upon request. Statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by 
*
,
**
 and 
***
 respectively. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics 
First, we find that the outcomes of the evaluations by the Screen Team and the crowd are broadly 
but not perfectly aligned: the Screen Team chose only two ideas ranked below 51
st
 position in the 
market, six ideas among those ranked between 31
st
 and 50
th
, and six among those ranked between 
the 11
th
 and 30
th
 positions. 
Tables 3 and 4 describe the features of the inventors and the ideas, highlighting their association 
with FMV and STC. First, we consider the signaling effect of inventors’ innovation experience. As 
expected, given the criteria for selection of participants, the majority of ideas were from inventors 
who had already patented, had authored a scientific paper, or had contributed to the IdeaWeb. Both 
the crowd and the Screen Team rewarded participation in the IdeaWeb, and rewarded patenting 
higher than scientific publishing. Seniority is positively correlated to STC and uncorrelated to 
FMV. In relation to the features of ideas, a longer description is weakly correlated to a higher FMV 
and to STC. Few ideas included links and attachments, and those that did, seemed to receive less 
positive evaluations. 
===PLEASE, INSERT TABLES 3 and 4 ABOUT HERE=== 
Regression analysis 
Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis. Model 1 analyzes the factors associated with 
STC, and model 2 considers the preference market, taking FMV as the dependent variable. Models 
3 and 4 consider whether the presence of links (3) and attachments (4) in a lengthy idea description 
reduce its value by adding unnecessary information. 
===PLEASE, INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE=== 
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The models reveal that the only proposal attribute associated with a positive assessment by both the 
crowd and the Screen Team is contribution to the IdeaWeb. Otherwise, the crowd and the Screen 
Team seem to gauge ideas based on different criteria, which supports Hypothesis-1. 
The features that are significantly associated with STC are those related to the attributes of 
inventors: previous patenting experience, scientific publishing, seniority, and as already mentioned, 
contribution to the IdeaWeb. In contrast to other kinds of experience, scientific publishing is 
negatively associated with selection, suggesting that a speculative attitude may indicate a lower 
ability to accomplish an innovation project. We suggest the positive effect of seniority might result 
from senior employees better ability to interpret the company's innovation strategy, and thus to 
direct their creative efforts to ideas that match such priorities, and their possibly higher visibility to 
the Screen Team. 
The attributes related to inventors (with the exception of contribution to the IdeaWeb) seem not to 
be considered by the crowd which instead, focuses on the features of ideas. Model 2 indicates that 
FMV is positively associated to the length of the idea description, negatively associated to the 
presence of links, and not associated to attachments. 
These results do not offer conclusive insights on the relationship between the amount of information 
offered by the description and the market value, because they do not consider the interplay between 
these different sources. Models 3 and 4 are consistent in indicating that when neither links nor 
attachments are present, a lengthier description is positively associated to FMV; however, the 
negative sign of the interaction term indicates that the introduction of links or attachments in ideas 
with long descriptions reduces their value. This means that additional sources create an over-
abundance of information which seems to confuse evaluators. To better appreciate this relationship, 
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we use the estimates of models 3 and 4 to calculate the impact of links and attachment on FMV at 
relevant percentiles of the distribution of Words (Table 6). 
===PLEASE, INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE=== 
The introduction of links and attachments is associated to a decrease in FMV for idea descriptions 
longer respectively than the 75
th
 and 90
th
 percentile of the distribution of Words; interestingly, 
attachments tend to improve the FMV of ideas whose description is in the 10
th
 percentile of length. 
In other words, inventors who offer copious information seem to be penalized compared to those 
who present a balanced mix of sources. We interpret this finding as indicating that the crowd is 
unable efficiently to process large amounts of information from different sources. However, the 
length of idea description, and the presence of optional sources are positively correlated, indicating 
that inventors do not seem to perceive the different sources of information as substitutes. Overall, 
these results provide support for Hypothesis-2.  
Conclusion 
This paper examined a preference market-based innovation contest to compare the attributes of 
ideas that are assessed favorably by a committee of managers and a crowd of expert scientists and 
R&D professionals. This innovation contest was effective in achieving simultaneously large-scale 
idea generation, circulation and transformation of knowledge held by individuals and groups (Ho et 
al. 2014), and direction of managerial attention towards the most promising early product ideas. 
This suggests that innovation contests, while respecting the principle of segregation between 
invention and evaluation activities (Demerest 1997), close the gap between them, and help to 
address the critical issue of prioritization of information in the NPD process (Bradfield & Gao 
2007). Our study contributes to an emerging field of research on preference market-based 
innovation contests (e.g. Soukhoroukova et al. 2012). It offers new evidence to support the notion 
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that in large, research-based companies these tools enhance the innovation process. Also, we 
highlight that effective knowledge management for NPD requires an appropriate infrastructure 
(Pandey & Dutta 2013), in this case in the form of a contest combining the advantages of a crowd 
and a management committee.    
Our main finding concerns the difference in the evaluations of crowds and committees. The 
empirical study shows that the crowd formulated its judgment based on information that would have 
been overlooked by the committee, and vice versa. The outcomes of the crowd’s and the 
committee’s judgments overlap in some respects, and differ critically in others. This result resonates 
with the findings in Piezunka and Dahlander (2015) concerning the decrease in organizations’ 
attention particularly on suggestions generated by a crowd which are far from the existing 
knowledge base. Therefore, reliance on multiple evaluation mechanisms is important for the 
assessment of discontinuous innovations.  
We provide evidence also that a preference market is effective for assisting problem solving but 
does not eliminate typical decision making issues such as information overload. Specifically, we 
found that crowds may overlook more articulated ideas that require lengthy textual descriptions and 
complementary references. While emphasizing that preference markets should be used to 
complement traditional evaluation tools, this result is particularly relevant since crowds have been 
regarded as better able than individuals and small groups to cope with information overflow in 
decision making. In this sense, we have identified a boundary to the “wisdom of crowds”. 
These findings are in line with recent studies cautioning that the adoption of knowledge 
management systems may lead to a rapid proliferation of the available information, beyond the 
ability of users to process it (e.g. Pandey & Dutta 2013). Consistent with previous studies (Ocasio 
1997; Krishnan & Ulrich 2001) our findings suggest that in such situations of information overload, 
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actors deselect overly complex, lengthy information or rely on other signals of valid solutions such 
as proponents' reputation (Ferris et al. 2014; Bentzen 2011) 
The literature on knowledge management in NPD predominantly has focused on the study of 
methodologies for information retrieval and circulation in the late stages of the process (e.g. 
Bradfield & Gao 2007; Xu 2014), or the design of multi-criteria group decision support systems 
(e.g. Chiu et al. 2006). Our findings suggest that new insights may be gained from focusing also on 
the organizational consequences of tools such as innovation contests that address the initial stages 
of idea generation and screening. 
Our study offers an important indication to organizations interested in adopting innovation contests: 
the combination of both crowds and existing R&D practices is essential, as they adopt 
complementary perspectives to idea screening and evaluation. The results also offer advice for 
inventors: in our case, those who provide long idea description also tend to supplement them with 
additional information, beyond the ability of evaluators to appreciate them. Consequently, inventors 
should carefully decide what to include in their proposals, so as to provide a “manageable” yet 
detailed amount of information. 
This finding suggests a tendency for crowds of R&D professionals to penalize proposals in 
technological domains that are unfamiliar to them, hence needing more elaborate explanations with 
since they go beyond what is commonly shared and taken for granted within an R&D organization. 
This finding offers the important insight that a crowd is less effective in gauging ideas departing 
from the current technological competence of a firm; a committee seems more suitable for an in-
depth analysis of such ideas. Companies should be aware that more complex ideas may be 
overlooked by crowds, and should therefore instruct committees to focus especially on more 
articulated proposals. 
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Our research has some limitations. First, the innovation contest was designed such that the Screen 
Team did not evaluate the ideas ranked in the first ten positions in the market. As a result, we 
cannot fully compare the preference functions of the crowd and the committee. Second, our study is 
based on a single case and its results cannot be generalized to all firms. However, our case 
highlights that in high-technology industries characterized by countless complex technological 
opportunities, preference markets are an efficient mechanism to systematically process these 
opportunities. We believe that further large-scale studies would contribute greatly to the validation 
of our findings in this field of research.  
Future studies could explore important issues which our work deemphasizes such as the relationship 
between the diversity of collective decision makers in terms of background and experience and 
outcomes of the evaluation. Indeed, diversity has been widely acknowledged as a driver of creative 
outcomes. We took account of diversity only in distinguishing between the broad levels of crowd 
and committee. It would seem important to understand whether the dimensions of diversity that are 
conducive to creative outcomes are matched in the evaluating teams, within the context of an 
innovation contest. Furthermore, more work is needed to disentangle the decision-making dynamics 
in committees, to better understand how they make use of the information generated by the 
preference market. This would provide a more thorough assessment of the utility of innovation 
contests as knowledge management tools. Finally, future studies could address the adoption of 
preference markets in the later stages of NPD, consistent with the trend towards gamification of an 
increasing number of business activities (Harman et al. 2014). 
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Table 1. Demographic profile of participants in Grow Bets 2011. 
Gender N. (%) 
Male 82 (75%) 
Female 27 (25%) 
Age class  
<36 22 (20%) 
36–40 16 (15%) 
41–45 35 (32%) 
46–50 17 (16%) 
>50 18 (17%) 
N/A 1 (1%) 
Location  
Denmark 55 (50%) 
Rest of the World 19 (17%) 
USA 35 (32%) 
Seniority  
0–4 32 (29%) 
5–9 16 (15%) 
10–14 29 (27%) 
15–19 13 (12%) 
20+ 18 (16%) 
N/A 1 (1%) 
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Table 2. Variables and measures. 
Variable Measure 
Dependent variables  
Final Market Value (FMV) Value of ideas at market close, divided by 1000. 
Screen Team Choice (STC) Value 1 if the Screen Team admitted the idea to the next step of the contest, 
and value 0 otherwise. 
Explanatory variables  
Patent Value 1 if at least one of the inventors had registered a patent before the 
competition, and value 0 otherwise. 
Article Value 1 if at least one of the inventors had published a scientific article before 
the competition, and value 0 otherwise. 
Idea Web Value 1 if at least one of the inventors had submitted a proposal to Idea Web 
before the competition, and value 0 otherwise. Idea Web is an internal virtual 
idea repository on which employees can post new product idea proposals for 
screening by R&D managers
1
. 
Seniority The number of years the leading inventor has been working at Novozymes. 
Words The number of words of the textual description of the idea. 
Link Value 1 if the idea description includes a link, and value 0 otherwise. 
Attachment Value 1 if the idea description includes an attachment, and value 0 otherwise. 
Control variables  
Inventors The number of inventors. It captures the potential for knowledge 
recombination in a team. 
Days Traded The number of days an idea has been up for trading. It affects FMV because 
the ideas that have been submitted later had fewer opportunities to be traded. 
Submissions Number of ideas submitted by inventors. More prolific inventors may be 
more creative, but may also be less focused on strengthening their many 
proposals. 
Location Distinguishes three locations: Denmark, USA, and the Rest of the World, that 
comprises Brazil, China, India and Japan. Screen Team or traders may be 
biased towards ideas submitted by inventors working in specific research 
sites. 
 
  
                                                             
1
  We gathered data on patenting, publishing and contribution to Idea Web from the records of the Human 
Resources and Library departments of Novozymes, and validated them with searches for patents in the Derwent 
World Patent Index database, and for articles in the ISI-Web of Science database. 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics on the relationship of categorical variables with FMV and STC.  
 N. (%) 
FMV 
Mean (Median) 
STC 
N. (%) 
    
IdeaWeb    
Yes 112 (55.7%) 3412 (1914) 11 (78.6%) 
No 89 (44.3%) 2167 (1436) 3 (21.4%) 
Patent    
Yes 156 (77.6%) 3100 (1858) 12 (85.7%) 
No 45 (22.4%) 2032 (1210) 2 (14.3%) 
Article    
Yes 139 (69.2%) 2972 (1687) 8 (57.1%) 
No 62 (30.8%) 2611 (1440) 6 (42.8%) 
Attachments    
Yes 19 (9.5%) 2588 (2223) 1 (7.1%) 
No 182 (90.5%) 2889 (1642) 13 (92.9%) 
Link    
Yes 30 (14.9%) 1808 (743) 4 (28.6%) 
No 171 (85.1%) 3046 (1832) 10 (71.4%) 
Location    
Denmark 75 (37.3%) 3769 (2619) 7 (50.0%) 
USA 54 (26.9%) 2940 (933) 5 (35.7%) 
Rest of the World 72 (35.8%) 1855 (490) 2 (14.3%) 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics on the relationship of continuous variables with FMV and STC. 
 Mean (Median) Mean (Median) Correlation with FMV  
 for STC (n=14) for not STC (n=187) (n=201) 
Seniority 11.857 (10) 9.995 (10) 0.050 
Words 208 (201) 188 (153) 0.128
*
 
Days traded 6.786 (6) 6.390 (5) -0.068 
Inventors 1.143 (1) 1.155 (1) -0.102 
Submissions 4.500 (3) 6.642 (5) -0.145
**
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Table 5 Results of regressions 
 
Model 1 
Probit  
DV: STC 
 
Model 2 
Tobit  
DV: FMV 
 
Model 3 
Tobit 
DV: FMV 
 
Model 4 
Tobit 
DV: FMV 
 
 Coef.  M.E. Coef.  M.E. Coef.  M.E. Coef.  M.E. 
Idea Web 
0.821
***
 
(0.295) 
0.045
**
 
(0.025) 
1507
*
 
(844) 
877.9
*
 
(474.2) 
1562
*
 
(836.9) 
907.6
*
 
(469.6) 
1571
*
 
(850.7) 
920.4
*
 
(480.5) 
Patent 
0.435* 
(0.228) 
0.032* 
(0.019) 
1015 (746) 
609.6 
(437.1) 
907.7 
(729.2) 
549.2 
(431.1) 
1036.5 
(779.1) 
627.8 
(456.9) 
Article 
-0.968
***
 
(0.359) 
-0.203
**
 
(0.101) 
-65.01 
(1055) 
-41.57 
(676.5) 
-37.48 
(1044) 
-23.97 
(668.8) 
232.1 
(1074) 
147.5 
(676.3) 
Seniority 
0.043
**
 
(0.019) 
0.005
***
 
(0.002) 
-4.771 
(48.54) 
-3.040 
(31.01) 
-8.839 
(48.46) 
-5.641 
(31.07) 
-7.053 
(48.30) 
-4.541 
(31.21) 
Link 
0.473 
(0.435) 
0.073 
(0.092) 
-1823
**
 
(787.4) 
-1042
***
 
(391.6) 
228.1 
(1228) 
-811.1
**
 
(384.7) 
-1855
**
 
(771.8) 
1067
***
 
(382.9) 
Attachments 
-0.329 
(0.606) 
-0.027 
(0.037) 
-235.7 
(922.6) 
-147.5 
(574.5) 
-319.4 
(901.0) 
-200.1 
(557.2) 
67.69*** 
(1.255) 
43.75** 
(505.6) 
Words 
0.473 
(0.435) 
-9.31*10^
-6
 
(9*10
^-6
) 
6.551
***
 
(2.409) 
4.174
***
 
(1.530) 
8.150
***
 
(2.813) 
5.201
***
 
(1.811) 
8.394
***
 
(2.566) 
5.404
***
 
(1.659) 
Link*Words     
-8.507
*
 
(4.381) 
-5.429
*
 
(2.855) 
  
Attachments* 
Words 
      
-16.35
***
 
(3.995) 
-10.53
***
 
(2.583) 
Inventors 
-0.011 
(0.238) 
-0.001 
(0.025) 
-500.4 
(359.7) 
-318.8 
(236.6) 
-398.9 
(344.2) 
-254.6 
(225.2) 
-584.3 
(365.5) 
-376.20 
(244.8) 
Submissions 
-0.063
*
 
(0.034) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
-148.4 
(94.63) 
-94.53 
(60.69) 
-143.2 
(93.27) 
-91.41 
(60.10) 
-158.0 
(95.20) 
-101.7 
(61.92) 
Region         
USA 
0.307 
(0.309) 
0.042 
(0.048) 
-594.3 
(865.7) 
-365.9 
(523.1) 
-559.9 
(853.5) 
-345.9
*
 
(517.3) 
-414.5 
(889.7) 
-260.6 
(551.5) 
Rest of the 
World 
-0.310 
(0.371) 
-0.026 
(0.028) 
-1755 
(1233) 
-1007 
(635.6) 
-1815.8 
(1202.8) 
-1038.8
*
 
(613.0) 
-1651 
(1226) 
-962.7 
(645.0) 
Days traded 
0.049* 
(0.028) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
98-.16 
(73.62) 
62.55 
(47.53) 
88.53 
(73.70) 
56.50 
(47.68) 
96.21 
(72.59) 
61.65 
(47.513) 
Constant 
-2.270
***
 
(0.463) 
 
1424
**
 
(1072) 
 
1145.7 
(1090) 
 
2530 
(1097) 
 
Log pseudo-
likelihood
  
-1539  -1539  -1539  -1537  
Sigma   3942 (267)  3918 (269)  
3.887 
(0.269) 
 
Notes: Observations=201. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6 Marginal effects of presence of links and attachments on FMV at relevant percentiles of Words. 
Percentile of 
Words 
N. of 
ideas 
Marginal effect of 
links 
N. of proposals 
with links  
Marginal effect of 
attachment 
N. of proposals 
with attachments 
Minimum (17) 1 53.52 (753.1) 0 (0%) 2129
**
 (968.9) 0 (0%) 
10
th
 (64) 19 -198.2 (619.9) 1 (5.3%) 1513
**
 (815.4) 1 (5.3%) 
25
th
 (103) 31 -398.3 (525.5) 2 (6.5%) 1026 (699.2) 2 (6.5%) 
50
th
 (155) 50 -652.5 (427.8) 5 (10%) 415.6 (600.0) 4 (8%) 
75
th
 (241) 50 -1041
***
 (354.0) 9 (18%) -481.2 (441.4) 7 (14%) 
90
th
 (348) 30 -1474
***
 (396.9) 6 (20%) -1396
***
 (414.3) 3 (10%) 
Maximum (815) 20 -4427
***
 (1559) 7 (35%) -5705
***
 (1206) 2 (10%) 
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Idea generation Idea screening Idea evaluation Maturation 
Increases: 
- Volume of ideas 
- Variety of ideas 
- Recombination 
- Integration 
Economizes on: 
- Attention 
- Time 
- Usage of scientific 
skills 
Leverages: 
- Specialized skills 
Improves: 
- Number of 
evaluators 
- Complementary 
capabilities 
- Avoids groupthink 
Innovation contests 
R&D teams      responsibility    R&D management 
Figure 1. Major advantages of innovation contests in the NPD process. 
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Idea value 
Characteristics of inventors 
Creativity 
Inventive experience 
Patenting experience 
Scientific experience 
Seniority in the firm 
Characteristics of ideas 
Richness of description 
Supplemental information 
(attachments, urls) 
Focus of Committee (H1) 
Focus of Crowd (H1) 
Trade-off (H2) 
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the conceptual model. 
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